There was a period in Russia which was called the period of "constitutional monarchy" (1906-1917). That was the name given it by historians, but this name was not compatible with the governmental doctrine of those days. The czar was forced to give [the people] a constitution, even though it was a restricted one. But the autocratic power never recognized the constitution as a constitution. The Duma [Translator's note: the Russian parliamentary body] was a parliament whose members were chosen on the basis of a peculiar method of representation, and were very restricted in their rights. The representatives of the existing government, however, did not even want to hear the word "parliament". The governmental doctrine regarded the basic laws of the regime--despite the fact that they were adaptations from Austrian and Japanese patterns--as inviolable and not subject to change.

Abroad, attempts have been made to counterpoise the rights of the monarchy and those of the representative institutions against each other, whereas in Russia the czar, with the acquiescence of the state council and the Duma, ruled the country by legislative enactments. Abroad, a constitution means the end of absolute power. In Russia, even under the new regime, the absolutist principles were preserved. Behind this deliberately confused phraseology was hidden the indisputable fact that the restrictions of the czarist power were in reality very weak and ephemeral. The principle of parliamentary rule was not carried out to its logical conclusion; it was not even carried out to the letter of the new law, and was constantly violated in practice. The czarist government had all the opportunities to violate constitutional rights, and was free to reverse its earlier procedures.

The phraseology about the "originality" of the new regime had its own historical source in the dogma of originality prevailing in Russia before the period of the constitution. Then it was accepted as a truism that Western-European 3constitutional concepts are the "great falsehood of our time". They are even being discarded abroad and, of course, are not at all applicable to Russia. But when these "inapplicable" principles, in spite of all obstacles, were introduced, the principles were neither accepted nor recognized. And this lack of recognition only weakened the new constitutional order.

We would be incorrect if we attempted to draw too close an analogy between the history of the Russian constitutional monarchy and that of the present-day "democratic" Soviet regime. In its edict of February 18, 1905, calling together the representatives of the people, and in the manifesto of October 17, which empowered the Duma to play a decisive role in the legislative matters of the country, the czarist government definitely began to compromise with the popular will and with the growing demands for reforms. These concessions, later on, proved to be irrevocable in their entirety, regardless of the attempts that had been made to annul them piecemeal. At present, no one speaks of any relinquishment of the dictatorship in Russia. On the contrary, according 4to all indications, one cannot help but notice that the so-called democratization is intended to secure the rule of the dictator in the country. One also cannot help but notice the application of the same trick, which has the same historical basis. Previously the dogma of Soviet Russia was to the effect that "bourgeois democracy," with all its institutions, was nothing but a falsehood, the great falsehood of capitalism, which deceives the workers by giving them paper rights. The great Lenin discovered the Soviet System--an entirely new and higher form of state rule, under which the working class governs itself through Soviets and congresses. The Soviet triumph over the treacherous parliamentary setting was made possible by the abolition of the provisional parliament. At present, the parliamentary regime suitable only for a "decadent capitalism" (an expression which quite aptly took the place of the old one--"decadent West") is itself in a state of decay, and the entire world will, sooner or later, adopt the Soviet form of government, which is the "higher" form.

Now, this Soviet form also goes on the scrap heap. Decadent forms of parliamentary elections are being introduced--the system of direct, secret, and equal ballot. But, of course, one should not even mention the fact that this reform is only the introduction of a simple parliamentary procedure borrowed from the bourgeois pattern. Everyone is supposed to know that bourgeois democracy has always been a fiction, and that Soviet democracy stands incomparably higher. These "plain truths" are just as "well known" in the U. S. S. R. as the fact, which was reported recently by Kalinin, that in the capitalist countries, doctors treat only the rich people. Everybody knows that all over the decadent West, fascism has swept away even the "last vestiges of freedom," even in places where "the parliamentary facade" has been preserved. But, as regards the U. S. S. R., it is climbing to the very pinnacle of "Soviet democracy," even though the Soviets themselves will be nonexistent.

What do Soviet authority and Soviet democracy mean without the Soviets?

They have the same meaning that autocratic rule side by side with representative institutions had. Under former conditions, it meant that they borrowed from Austrian and Japanese patterns the most innocuous constitutional procedures, which, even though they were so innocuous, were quite frequently disregarded in practice. At present, the preservation of the "Soviet" style means that while thundering against "Fascism," the Soviet authority is getting ready to conduct elections on the basis of a single party slate, that is, according to the Fascist style. Doubtless, the Bolsheviks will outsmart the Fascist dictators even at their own game.