If, in arranging the parade at the Exhibition building, the Chicago Socialists had the intention of hastening the adoption of the State militia law, they will find that the bill may pass. At least the local English press spares no effort in trying to convince the block-headed farmer representatives in springfield that the present army of communists represents a "tremendous danger" to Chicago.

The major points of contention will be the spite and hatred which the agricultural population bears for the metropolis of Chicago, and the fear of an upheaval (and its consequences) which may spread far beyond the confines of the city.

But adoption of the militia bill, that is, providing an appropriation for it of one fifth of a mill of the State's valuation would not guarantee an adquate, 2well-organized army. Far from it! Of course, there would be no dearth of people desirous of being colonels, majors, and captains; but the lack of men [for the ranks] would be very apparent, Not that we lack young men who are clamoring for a fight, if the opportunity presents itself; but among such a group there are but few who are willing to participate in monotonous, fatiguing exercises--which appear to them to be superfluous--and in submitting to a rigorous discipline. Without the latter, soldiering is but a childish diversion; those who regard military service in that manner would not be very reliable in times of serious conflict.

The great majority of the citizens do not believe that armed Socialists are a potential peril to the populace. It may be a mistake, but that does not change the fact. The average "peaceful inhabitant" or "Stuffed citizen," "bourgeois", as the Socialists allude to him--reasons in this manner: "Whom do the Socialists intend to fight, and what do they expect to gain thereby? What can be attained by force of arms, beyond what they already possess? They [Socialists] can speak, write, and print whatever they like; they are able to nominate and elect candidates 3if they have enough votes; in short, all the liberties and rights their fellow members strive for in Europe are in full force here. Why then should the Socialists start a fight?"

To all these questions there is but one answer. The Socialists might, like Brennus of Rome, throw their sword into the scales and thus change a minority into a majority. In other words, the attainment of a plurality by peaceful methods, propoganda or agitation might appear too slow and tedious. In such cases, other parties have resorted to bullets as a substitute for sufficient ballots. This is called a revolution.

Even for that, one must have sufficient reasons, and they are difficult to find at this time. Even a revolutionary army would be inconsequential if it were with-out leaders who know at least a little more than the individual soldiers. The commanders must know what can be achieved under the most auspicious circumstances; they are not likely to risk their men's limbs--nor their own--on the strength of mere prospects. But what can the Socialists of Chicago achieve by fighting? No 4repeal of State laws, to be sure; nor the separation of Chicago from the remainder of the State, so that they could establish here a counterpart to "New Zion." as the tailor Johann Bockold, aided by his hangman Knipperdolling, did with the bishopric of Muenster!

This much the leaders of the Socialists probably know, that their power outside of Chicago is nil. There is no gainsaying the fact that five hundred well-armed men under proper leadership could take possession of the city hall, destroy the waterworks and gas plants, and exterminate a few dozen persons, as well as resort to incendiarism, and so forth. Assuming that this transpired, then what? Would it hasten the inauguration of the future state by even a single hour? Could the starving workers obtain bread, that is, profitable employment thereby? Would the machinery, etc., be appropriated by the state by such procedures and thus accrue to the community? Might not this cause a sudden cessation of all transportation and stoppage of income, a suspension of Chicago's grain, live stock, and lumber supply; also the closing of factories and killing of trade? And if this stagnation is to be combated by plundering the "rich," the "snobs" and the 5"infamous capitalists," what would be the result?

Their homes and furniture could not be eaten. As for cash in a drawer, only a few people keep any there, and wealth consisting only of paper has no tangible value. After all, what is a bond or mortgage worth to anyone who acquires it forcibly? No more than a bit of tinder. The same applies to other valuable papers and securities, the value of which depends upon an uninterrupted, successful operation of a business. Of course, the banks could be robbed, but how long would the money last?

These are questions which not every Socialist is going to ponder over, but their leaders surely consider them. After all, these men are not crazy, hot-headed Frenchmen, but are Germans, and are not as dumb as they appear at times. At least this much is clear to them: 1) Chicago is not Paris; 2) even in Paris, communism lasted only a few weeks, and then succumbed to a terrible bloody reaction.

We admit the possibility that the Socialists might subjugate the city for a short 6period, but that does not indicate, by any means, that they have such intentions. To assume such a thing, one must regard their leaders as senseless oxen, and we just won't believe that they belong to that species.