At the beginning of this month the question of peace was discussed by the parliaments of all European nations. It was disposed of by all of them. By the governments of the Allies very definitely and unmistakably; by the German government more hesitatingly and with some misgiving, and particularly with an undertone stressing that "'they' do not want peace, so what's the use of talking about it". At the same time, all newspapers discussed the war situation, and the chances of a victory for one or the other group.

Many a person who reads the papers and follows the events of the war, the battles fought and the movements of the armies, believes as the leading German politicians believer, who are sure that the Allies were beaten already some months ago, and wonder why they do not want to admit that fact and sue for peace. But the fact of the matter is that the Allies are not aware of, do not admit any defeat, and that they are prepared to continue fighting for several years. Nobody denies that all advantages on the battlefields are on 2Germany's side, and that the Germans go from one success to another. But, at the same time, nobody doubts that the Germans were the first to get tired of the war and would like to make an end to it.

Right at the beginning of the war it was said that if Germany failed to win a quick victory the war would become a war of "keep on fighting," "bear it as long as one can," a war of sapping one another's energy and resources, a war of starving one another's populations. England's point of view in this respect has been expressed very clearly by Winston Churchill who, when leaving the battlefield, said: "Old wars were decided by individual battles. One battle could decide the outcome of a long war. But this war is different. The idea for which it is being waged is more important than what is going on on the battlefields. We do not have to win any spectacular victories, any great battles, but all the same, we shall win the war. While the Germans are deep in the enemy's territories, while their flags are flying over occupied cities and provinces, while, to all appearances, they pile victory upon victory, Germany may be more fatally and more decisively beaten in the second or 3third year of the war than if the Allies had taken Berlin right in the first year of it."

To the English, who were depressed and in a pessimistic frame of mind, this statement was a great consolation. All their newspapers commented upon it. The New Statesman says about it: "These words that size up the slow, but just that much more certain, working of Nemesis on Germany are a much more truthful description of the situation and are much more fitting than those we hear so frequently: 'Had we done this, or that, the war would be over by now.'"

This optimism, however, is not general with all English newspapers. There are doubters among them who feel that the "incidents on the battlefields" which Churchill speaks about are getting to be too frequent, and that a few more of them could very well have a most decisive influence on the outcome of the whole war. Particularly the Serbian "incident" made a very strong impression on public opinion in England. The Outlook writes about it: "We agree with Churchill that, in general, our chances are good. But let us not forget that 4what is for us--here on our island surrounded by water and safe from an invasion--just an 'incident,' appears to the Serbian nation to be an annihilation, a great national tragedy. The Serbian 'incident' is, in the eyes of the Allies and particularly the Western Allies, just a sad affair, more sad than the Dardanelles 'incident' in the opinion of those who have believed and still believe that the only vulnerable point of the Central Powers is somewhere deep in German territory, and that the road from Berlin to Constantinople is longer than the road from Verdun to Mainz. The Serbian 'incident' is that much more painful for us, and that much more embarrassing--I am using this word purposely--because it has caught us unprepared and because it could have been prevented. It had been foreseen by diplomats, had involved certain promises and obligations on our part which we have not fulfilled because we came too late."

The Nation believes that the time when a war could be decided by one splendid, victorious battle is past, and says: 'It appears that victory depends on the number of trained and trainable men which the nation's resources enable it to maintain. But on the other hand it must not be forgotten that no matter how 5large that number may be, it is not inexhaustible, and every nation will eventually reach its limits. A nation is encouraged and strengthened by a victory on the battlefield, but losses and defeats may have a decisive bearing on its final exhaustion. Churchill's statement may, therefore, be valuable in general, but it would be fatal if it should make us less enthusiastic or indifferent."

The Nation goes on: "Considering the course of the whole war we cannot fail to see the difference between the first six months of it and the second half of the first year. While, at the beginning, the Germans put forth their most powerful efforts, they came close to being defeated. The Battle of the Marne was so decisive that it ruined all German hopes for a final victory. Strange to say, success was with Germany, however, during the following six months, and that should make us stop and consider whether Churchill's assurances are not somewhat dangerous. Perhaps we could have won by now if we had not been too sure that we shall win in the end."

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Then, speaking of the failures in Egypt, at Gallipoli, and in the Balkans in general, the paper says: "It seems that our trouble is indifference. Particularly in times of crises we seem to be extremely indifferent. What happened during the great offensives in May and in September? Victory was almost in the hands of our soldiers. But they lost it, because of the incompetence of their officers. It would be timely to find out whether the Allies have a plan, an idea, as to how they will finally defeat Germany. Heavy losses of man power and the danger of hunger are not serious enough to make the Germans accept such a peace as we want, and accept it reasonably soon. We do not doubt that we have the greater advantages. But if we rely on them too much, and permit two more neutrals on the Balkan Peninsula to join our enemy, it may easily happen that we shall land in a mire. If we fail to take a decisive and quick action, if we fail to see the future and prepare plans, we shall be fighting in vain."